As a respite from the parade of daily essays I have been releasing in bulk, I’ve decided to dig up this paper I wrote for my British Politics class that preceded my trip to the United Kingdom. It seems to be an appropriate time to release this discussion on Scottish independence and UK devolution, given the subject of the third episode.
If a unified future is assumed arbitrarily, a viable route may be proposed through evaluation of a dialectical model, beginning with the thesis of a democracy shared between the two nations and meandering toward a muddy synthesis of a similar ilk. While the relationship was born predominantly of financial coercion and the history has substantial bulk, the most cogent antithesis has a more modern origin in the mid-twentieth century with the rise of the Scottish National Party, which had been previously established in 1928 soon after the establishment of the Irish Free State.
A Scottish national identity has been evident since before the Union of the Crowns in 1603, but it remained politically subdued into the 1950s by the economics of the relationship with England, when the Conservative Party still held substantial influence in the north. However, loyalties in Scotland began to shift toward the Labour Party in the 1959 general election as a shrinking industrial economy prompted by globalization and British decolonization highlighted a need for stronger representation for the working class. The economic downturn also kindled a newfound popularity for the Scottish National Party (SNP), as English contributions to northern prosperity appeared to be dwindling, calling into question the value of continued partnership.
After four decades in the background, the SNP first breached into mainstream politics in 1967 with the election of Winnie Ewing as the MP from Hamilton, elevating “Scottishness” from a cultural to a political identity. After Ewing’s election, the party and movement experienced middling success until the early 1970s when oil was discovered in the North Sea. The potential value of the find had nationalists imagining Scotland as the “Kuwait of the North,” but their shared sovereignty within the United Kingdom meant that control of the oil reserves would flow through Westminster, not Edinburgh. This truly stoked the Scottish nationalist movement, as the SNP won 11 seats in Parliament in the 1974 general election and ran second to Labour for 30 others, truly becoming the opposition despite having no distinctive party identity.
With this electoral success and SNP’s rising threat to Labour’s dominance in Scotland, a referendum was proposed by PM Jim Callaghan and his ruling government as a means of quenching Scottish thirst for sovereignty. If passed, this referendum would have devolved a level of authority in Westminster to a new parliament in Scotland. Unfortunately, despite a majority of “yes” votes on 1 March 1979, the referendum ultimately failed due to a “poison-pill” amendment that mandated 40% of the voting population cast a ballot in favor of passage. The referendum’s failure, along with the “Winter of Discontent” in which public-worker strikes decimated the favorability of the Labour government, led to a successful vote of no confidence against PM Callaghan, as the SNP MPs sided with the Tory opposition, prompting a new general election by a single vote. With this swing in public opinion came the reign of Margaret Thatcher and a protracted stall in the devolution movement. As an act of retribution against the party that failed to deliver more influence to them, Scottish nationalists propelled a figure into power that aimed to strip them of it.
While Thatcher oversaw an economic resurgence fueled by the national oil boom, she also instituted policies that angered Scotland, where she was considered bourgeois and the “incarnation of undesirable Britishness.” Scots were particularly riled in 1988 when she spoke in Edinburgh to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland professing that her economic policies promoted Christian ideals. The end to Thatcher’s reign was hastened by her government’s implementation of a poll tax in Scotland in 1989, a year before the rest of the UK.
Her actions drove protests against the supposed lack of a Tory mandate in the north, where the Labour party still held substantial power. During this time, opposition to Thatcher’s policies and rhetoric allowed Alex Salmond and the ’79 Group to galvanize the SNP’s message by addressing the party’s sectarian divisions thus facilitating a rise to prominence. Although the SNP remained a political minority, their message permeated the Labour message as Thatcher departed 10 Downing Street.
Following Thatcher’s departure, Scottish devolution became a major plank in Labour’s platform under John Smith, who believed its success would secure his party’s power in Scotland. Following Smith’s death in 1994, Tony Blair rose to party leader, implementing the “New Labour” platform of which devolution was the flagship policy. Upon his election to prime minister in 1997, Blair’s government put forth a second devolution referendum which passed with overwhelming support of ~75%. While Labour and the SNP shared in the success of the vote, their ensuing objectives reignited a mutual opposition. In “The Referendum Campaign,” James Mitchell identified the obstacle that eluded John Smith’s foresight: “Labour saw devolution as the end of Scotland’s constitutional journey whereas the SNP saw it as a stepping stone to independence (pg. 88).”
Throughout Tony Blair’s decade as PM, the New Labour policies like welfare reforms and tuition increases slowly diminished party influence in Scotland, and the UK’s involvement in the Iraq War was catastrophic. Labour ultimately lost the majority to the SNP in the Scottish parliament in 2007—the same year Blair left office—before being dominated in the next election in 2011. Following the elevation of Alex Salmond and the SNP to leadership in Scotland, plans began to percolate for a formal referendum for Scottish independence.
In 2012, PM David Cameron of the Conservative Party announced that the referendum would take place, formally legitimizing the campaign, and soon after Alex Salmond announced the date of the vote to be 18 September 2014. Following a combative campaign that included a government campaign dubbed “Project Fear”—a dubious tactic that was likely counterproductive—the referendum ultimately failed 55%-45%, prompting Salmond’s departure and Nicola Sturgeon’s elevation to Scotland’s First Minister.
Despite the failure, the SNP was emboldened by the results, as polls at the launch of the campaign only showed 28% favorability for the referendum, indicating a 17-point increase in support during the campaign, with many detractors voting “no” for fear of exclusion from the European Union. Nearly two years later, another referendum campaign would negate this concern, as UK citizens voted for a timely exit from the EU, with “Project Fear” again playing a prominent role for the opposition. This “Brexit” vote provided Scottish citizens who voted overwhelmingly to remain in the EU with a new cause to question the sovereignty of Westminster over their nation.
Few cases exist in modern politics to provide historical context for the Scottish independence movement, but the 1995 referendum in Quebec has significant analytical value. The two regions each have a culture that is demonstrably unique from the rest of the country, and both felt that the government was unjustly trivializing their concerns. Quebec had previously held a referendum in 1980 that failed by a wide margin, but the 1995 attempt was barely defeated by one point (Quebec, n.d.). Since this time, support persists for Quebec’s independence from Canada, but the constitutional battle that took place in the country aided in galvanizing the country and effectively quelling the nationalist aspirations in Quebec (Valiante, 2015).
Although British unionists may be emboldened by the historical example above, the two peripheral conditions of the two referendums are notably different for a number of reasons:
After four decades in the background, the SNP first breached into mainstream politics in 1967 with the election of Winnie Ewing as the MP from Hamilton, elevating “Scottishness” from a cultural to a political identity. After Ewing’s election, the party and movement experienced middling success until the early 1970s when oil was discovered in the North Sea. The potential value of the find had nationalists imagining Scotland as the “Kuwait of the North,” but their shared sovereignty within the United Kingdom meant that control of the oil reserves would flow through Westminster, not Edinburgh. This truly stoked the Scottish nationalist movement, as the SNP won 11 seats in Parliament in the 1974 general election and ran second to Labour for 30 others, truly becoming the opposition despite having no distinctive party identity.
With this electoral success and SNP’s rising threat to Labour’s dominance in Scotland, a referendum was proposed by PM Jim Callaghan and his ruling government as a means of quenching Scottish thirst for sovereignty. If passed, this referendum would have devolved a level of authority in Westminster to a new parliament in Scotland. Unfortunately, despite a majority of “yes” votes on 1 March 1979, the referendum ultimately failed due to a “poison-pill” amendment that mandated 40% of the voting population cast a ballot in favor of passage. The referendum’s failure, along with the “Winter of Discontent” in which public-worker strikes decimated the favorability of the Labour government, led to a successful vote of no confidence against PM Callaghan, as the SNP MPs sided with the Tory opposition, prompting a new general election by a single vote. With this swing in public opinion came the reign of Margaret Thatcher and a protracted stall in the devolution movement. As an act of retribution against the party that failed to deliver more influence to them, Scottish nationalists propelled a figure into power that aimed to strip them of it.
While Thatcher oversaw an economic resurgence fueled by the national oil boom, she also instituted policies that angered Scotland, where she was considered bourgeois and the “incarnation of undesirable Britishness.” Scots were particularly riled in 1988 when she spoke in Edinburgh to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland professing that her economic policies promoted Christian ideals. The end to Thatcher’s reign was hastened by her government’s implementation of a poll tax in Scotland in 1989, a year before the rest of the UK.
Her actions drove protests against the supposed lack of a Tory mandate in the north, where the Labour party still held substantial power. During this time, opposition to Thatcher’s policies and rhetoric allowed Alex Salmond and the ’79 Group to galvanize the SNP’s message by addressing the party’s sectarian divisions thus facilitating a rise to prominence. Although the SNP remained a political minority, their message permeated the Labour message as Thatcher departed 10 Downing Street.
Following Thatcher’s departure, Scottish devolution became a major plank in Labour’s platform under John Smith, who believed its success would secure his party’s power in Scotland. Following Smith’s death in 1994, Tony Blair rose to party leader, implementing the “New Labour” platform of which devolution was the flagship policy. Upon his election to prime minister in 1997, Blair’s government put forth a second devolution referendum which passed with overwhelming support of ~75%. While Labour and the SNP shared in the success of the vote, their ensuing objectives reignited a mutual opposition. In “The Referendum Campaign,” James Mitchell identified the obstacle that eluded John Smith’s foresight: “Labour saw devolution as the end of Scotland’s constitutional journey whereas the SNP saw it as a stepping stone to independence (pg. 88).”
Throughout Tony Blair’s decade as PM, the New Labour policies like welfare reforms and tuition increases slowly diminished party influence in Scotland, and the UK’s involvement in the Iraq War was catastrophic. Labour ultimately lost the majority to the SNP in the Scottish parliament in 2007—the same year Blair left office—before being dominated in the next election in 2011. Following the elevation of Alex Salmond and the SNP to leadership in Scotland, plans began to percolate for a formal referendum for Scottish independence.
In 2012, PM David Cameron of the Conservative Party announced that the referendum would take place, formally legitimizing the campaign, and soon after Alex Salmond announced the date of the vote to be 18 September 2014. Following a combative campaign that included a government campaign dubbed “Project Fear”—a dubious tactic that was likely counterproductive—the referendum ultimately failed 55%-45%, prompting Salmond’s departure and Nicola Sturgeon’s elevation to Scotland’s First Minister.
Despite the failure, the SNP was emboldened by the results, as polls at the launch of the campaign only showed 28% favorability for the referendum, indicating a 17-point increase in support during the campaign, with many detractors voting “no” for fear of exclusion from the European Union. Nearly two years later, another referendum campaign would negate this concern, as UK citizens voted for a timely exit from the EU, with “Project Fear” again playing a prominent role for the opposition. This “Brexit” vote provided Scottish citizens who voted overwhelmingly to remain in the EU with a new cause to question the sovereignty of Westminster over their nation.
Few cases exist in modern politics to provide historical context for the Scottish independence movement, but the 1995 referendum in Quebec has significant analytical value. The two regions each have a culture that is demonstrably unique from the rest of the country, and both felt that the government was unjustly trivializing their concerns. Quebec had previously held a referendum in 1980 that failed by a wide margin, but the 1995 attempt was barely defeated by one point (Quebec, n.d.). Since this time, support persists for Quebec’s independence from Canada, but the constitutional battle that took place in the country aided in galvanizing the country and effectively quelling the nationalist aspirations in Quebec (Valiante, 2015).
Although British unionists may be emboldened by the historical example above, the two peripheral conditions of the two referendums are notably different for a number of reasons:
- The vote for Scottish independence was government sanctioned.
- The Canadian government declined an active role in Quebec’s independence campaign.
- The failure of the Scottish referendum was partly predicated on fears about the EU that were stoked based on the false pretense that membership would only be guaranteed by remaining in the UK.
While current sentiment in Scotland and a popularly anticipated outcome is for another near-future referendum on independence and withdrawal from the United Kingdom in favor of EU membership, the rational synthesis of this analysis is for Scotland to remain with expanded sovereignty. However, for this outcome to be sustainable, the UK Parliament will need to make substantial concessions to the Scottish government that would render a prospective departure ultimately untenable. Such an action is ultimately desirable for the UK government, as a Scottish exodus would lead to both of the British Isles being divided by a border with the EU, tightening an economic cinch that would threaten the national sovereignty that Brexit was intended to solidify.
As we are dwelling in the hypothetical, a simple suggestion for a resolution to this conundrum seems only fair. It can be fairly asserted that the relationship between Scotland and England has been predominantly transactional rather than sentimental, as neither seems notably loyal to the other. As discussed above, devolution of power from Westminster has been an ongoing process for decades, with Scotland being the driving benefactor. The only outcome I expect would be capable of preventing Scotland’s eventual departure would be an advanced devolution to a true federal system that would also resolve the “English votes for English laws” kerfuffle.
In this scenario, Westminster would house the federal legislative body, while England would establish a separate sovereign parliament to rule on southern “EVEL” issues. Scotland and Wales would gain expanded powers equal to those held in the English government, with the UK Parliament retaining ultimate sovereignty. The exclusion of Northern Ireland is intentional, as ultimately ostracizing them in favor of the nations of Great Britain would likely provoke reunification of Ireland and ease trade tensions between the two islands. While this is the most rational outcome I foresee, I refuse to place odds on it and am hesitant to offer a timeline. If Brexit takes the House of Commons more than three years to sort out, a timeline for something of this magnitude might fall between generations and never.
References
Quebec separatists narrowly defeated. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/quebec-separatists-narrowly-defeated
Valiante, G. & St-Arnaud, P. (28 October 2015). Quebec's 1995 referendum far from last gasp for sovereignty hopes. Retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-1995-referendum-look-back-1.3292214
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